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The personalistic linkages that generally define Malaysian politics come into sharp relief when candidates 
confront the imperative of winning office. Malaysia’s 14th general election (GE14), as other previous 
iterations, saw politicians emphasize their ‘personal touch’ and offer a barrage of targeted promises. Yet these 
relationships are not confined to elections and reflect deep connections between voters and politicians – not 
only for politicians in the long-dominant Barisan Nasional coalition, but also for the newly victorious Pakatan 
Harapan parties. The authors of this article draw on original survey data to show the embeddedness of these 
relationships beyond elections. In GE14, the Pakatan coalition could bank on their experience in power, as 
well as present a broad, economics-oriented campaign that was able to reassure voters that they would not lose 
out on the personal attention and material benefits they had come to expect from their politicians. As such, 











Malaysia’s 14th general election (GE14), held on 9 May 2018, marked a decisive shift in the country’s 
electoral balance of power. For the first time, the long-dominant National Front (Barisan Nasional, BN), 
spearheaded by the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), lost its majority at the federal level and a 
new ruling coalition, the Alliance of Hope (Pakatan Harapan, PH), took its place. Multiple factors account for 
BN’s defeat and PH’s surprising win. Especially key were incumbent Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak’s 
ensnarement in a massive corruption scandal that amplified persistent economic worries, and a reconfigured 
opposition coalition’s embracing as leader the ultimate regime-insider-turned-opponent, Mahathir Mohamad. 
Still, BN remained optimistic that it could win, aided by partisan delimitation of constituencies1 and an 
apparent multi-corner agreement with the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (Parti Islam seMalaysia, PAS) playing 
spoiler against PH. 
As the campaign proceeded, BN retained a tight grip on state resources. As usual, its campaign appeals were 
centred on promises of large-scale infrastructure projects, coupled with more immediate, generally smaller-
scale ‘goodies’, which could never be matched by the opposition parties. As such, voters swayed by such 
patronage had incentive to stick with BN rather than toying with a new alternative. Yet, this time, BN lost. 
This article examines relationships among voters, parties, and politicians in the context of this puzzling 
outcome, arguing that BN’s loss does not signal that political loyalties generated through patronage (the use of 
public resources for private benefits) or clientelism (reciprocal relationships between politicians and voters 
predicated on the exchange of goods for political support) are now unimportant or radically changed. Rather, 
we argue that all parties relied on elected office to mediate access to resources and generate political loyalty 
among their constituents. Building its own clientelistic relationships allowed PH to compete better with BN’s 
real and promised benefits, augmenting PH’s more distinct normative appeals. The cultivation of personalized 
support through affective ties serves not only to transmit public benefits to private actors – a classic form of 
patronage – but also to reinforce the distinction between clientelist networks and material patronage.2 
PH’s ability to create and maintain these relationships prior to 2018 was constrained, given both the 
geographic concentration of its legislators and its limited access to state resources. The BN also relied more 
heavily on patronage strategies than did PH, in an election substantially centred around allegations of rank 
corruption and the related clash of titans as Mahathir sided with one-time heir-apparent, then foe, Anwar 
Ibrahim to take on another erstwhile protégé, Najib. But we propose that PH’s ability to cultivate these 
relationships was important in two ways: both to cement the loyalties of voters who would face competing 
offers by an incumbent federal government eager to recover lost state-level ground, and as a ‘demonstration 
effect’ to reassure voters of their representatives’ diligent attention, including the prospect of further benefits, 
should PH win national power. 
Notwithstanding the alteration in power they effected, the elections reaffirm the salience of an established 
mode of personalized politics in Malaysia, in which politicians cultivate direct relationships and distribute 
goods as well as services to constituents to secure political support. Our research in the previous years and 
during the election indicates that the opposition parties in PH (and its forerunner from 2008 to 2015, People’s 
Alliance or Pakatan Rakyat) had long since begun cultivating links with voters that helped make real their 
promises to keep both state aid and more personal support available to citizens. 
To examine these dynamics, we present original evidence from a 2016 survey in Malaysia3 that investigates 
how BN and PH legislators built relationships with constituents, and citizens’ concomitant attitudes and 
behaviours. We focus on how PH, in opposition, sought to reproduce scaled-down approximations of the 
politician–voter linkages BN had cultivated for decades.4 While BN could implicitly or explicitly sanction 
voters who did not return their support, PH parties aimed to generate ‘feelings of obligation’5 among recipients 
that would translate into political loyalty, thus blurring the line between constituency service and clientelism. 
Toward these ends, we first review the literature on politician–citizen linkages and their manifestations in 
Malaysia. We then draw on evidence from the survey to drill down into the dynamics undergirding 
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relationships between politicians and parties with citizens, before considering the extent to which past praxis 
changed or continued in the 2018 election. In the final section, we consider the consequences of incumbent 
turnover for these relationships and speculate on what we might see over the next several years, as PH and BN 
adapt to their changed fortunes and prepare to contest anew. 
Understanding Politician–Voter Linkages 
Central to this inquiry is the notion of linkages, or ‘the grounds on which politicians are accountable and 
responsive to citizens’ (p. 845) – whether based on charisma (personal style, symbols, and gestures), 
programmatic promises (policies that distribute costs and benefits among citizens regardless of vote-choice), 
or clientelism (particularistic connections).6 In any polity, we may see a mix of forms (from a party’s 
‘portfolio’ of micro-targeted and collective goods7 to how different voters relate to their elected officials), 
although one mode may predominate. For instance, where clientelist linkages are salient, we expect to see 
politicians relying heavily on targeted benefits delivered via personal networks; even voters excluded from 
those networks, though, may support a politician for specific policies in their party’s manifesto. Potentially 
more durable than charismatic linkages, clientelist ones tend to be less preferred from a normative standpoint 
than programmatic linkages, since they do less to encourage efficient state outputs. 
Definitions of clientelism are persistently inconsistent, with applications to a wide variety of political, 
‘problem-solving’, or power relationships.8  The literature on clientelism in Southeast Asia specifically 
invokes a long-established focus on patron–client ties. Its core is a network of interlinked, hierarchically 
structured, face-to-face, reciprocal, enduring pairs, dating back to relationships between landlords and tenants 
or sharecroppers, with sociological implications extending well beyond politics and elections, which is our 
focus here. Each member of a dyad supplies something the other needs and cannot independently acquire. 
Where clientelist linkages predominate, such direct, essentially symbiotic, personal relationships remain more 
central to political organization than ideological, class, or organizational ties.9  
In elections, clientelist linkages foreground informal institutions within the democratic process and render 
elusive the ideal of responsible party government, in which alignment of policy preferences determines 
electoral support and post-election priorities. Rather, democratic accountability rests less on overall progress 
towards promises of economic growth, social welfare, or other public goods, but more on exchange of votes 
for payments or particularistic benefits, even as direct local-community ties scale up to become increasingly 
symmetrical, intermittent, instrumental-rational, and broker-mediated.10 11 in voting behaviour – politicians’ 
brokers still monitor compliance.12 Notably, clientelistic strategies are possible not only for ruling parties, but 
also for non-government parties that may substitute private funding (or use limited access to state resources) 
to build these relationships.13  
Patronage14 often reinforces clientelist linkages. Hence, for instance, we have the paradox of reform that Ellen 
Lust describes in the Middle East: incumbent members of parliament (MPs) resist turning against 
authoritarian regimes lest they lose access to what state resources they have. Such ‘competitive clientelism’ 
produces expectations and incentives that make legislative elections more about distributing patronage among 
elites for distribution downwards among their clients than about pressing for liberalization.15 If what is being 
traded for votes, though, are public goods – those from which no one can be excluded except per documented, 
non-discretionary (and actually followed) criteria – the relationship at stake is necessarily programmatic, not 
clientelistic.16  
In contemporary praxis, clientelist linkages may be less often face-to-face, but they nevertheless persist. In 
Ghana, for instance, despite a strongly institutionalized parliamentary system, citizens hold MPs accountable 
for personal assistance and community development. MPs spend much of their time distributing private (or 
collective club) goods or performing community service, leaving little time for legislating or exercising 
executive oversight.17 Afrobarometer data suggest that African voters understand how unlikely it is for MPs or 
their intermediaries to personally bestow benefits upon more than a fraction of the constituency, and most 
grasp the greater utility they derive from wider-scale development projects than sporadic handouts. But MPs 
still need to show themselves to be present in the community and looking out for the constituency.18 
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Exceeding ‘normal’ community service, legislators across varied regime and economic contexts, particularly 
where electoral rules or backbencher status encourage a personal vote, spend copious time interacting directly 
with constituents, cultivating appealing mannerisms, and investing in outreach. This happens even where 
parties are strong or when the direct electoral benefit of such networking and service-provision is uncertain, 
driven by pay-off in opportunity for credit-claiming, including for programmatic policies, and reputation-
building through personal ties.19  
Clientelist linkages are not all bad, however obvious the negatives. Emphasizing private and club rather than 
public goods fosters inefficiency and imbalance in goods supplied and perpetuates informal institutions and 
incumbency advantage, marginalizing formal institutions better tuned to maximizing representation, 
accountability, and systemic oversight. It may also cultivate short time-horizons for voters or politicians, 
dependency on discretionary public resources, bloated public-sector budgets, corruption, and exclusive rather 
than inclusive policy-making, given politicians’ need to demonstrate special attention. Yet clientelism may 
also encourage responsiveness, direct accountability, and useful redistribution, and gives citizens a path to 
secure benefits from the state, including where formal institutions for social welfare fall short.20  
Politician–Voter Linkages in Malaysia 
Malaysia is unique in the region for its strong parties both in government and opposition. Even so, Malaysian 
political praxis has always combined clientelism with ideological messaging and programmatic promises. Its 
personalized dimension has perversely become more rather than less endemic over time. Central to building 
and sustaining support, across all parties, is what is known ubiquitously in Malaysia as the ‘personal touch’, or 
‘going to the ground’ to demonstrate presence and concern, blurring the line between constituency service in 
democratic contexts and clientelist linkages. Unsurprisingly, this tendency towards such linkages also 
encourages distribution of patronage, more often in the form of contingent club goods than individually 
pitched private goods. 
Yet two important distinctions have applied until now, across both the recipients of particularistic benefits and 
the parties that dispense them. That power has now changed hands will surely temper these patterns, though to 
some extent the key players might simply change places. 
First, the content of particularistic relationships and their potential welfare implications for citizens have 
varied considerably across parties. The BN has been able to use its position to promise, and to deliver, 
everything from roads to schools to massive development projects in exchange for political support. Some 
such projects are BN’s writ large, distributed contingently on geographic or identity basis. Others track a 
particular component party, being pitched to the relevant ethnic community, under BN’s largely communal 
coalition framework. Many tread the line between programmatic and clientelistic – but tilt towards the latter 
when a project’s siting is clearly political or a politician expressly expects reciprocation. Until now, BN had 
been able to follow through on implied or explicit threats of denying non-supporters access to development 
funds, infrastructure, and other economic opportunities, making clear the exchange relationship involved. For 
instance, in this election Najib promised residents of the public-housing flats surrounding a rally venue that if 
BN won they could purchase their homes – and the bigger the win, the better the price. He was explicit: ‘I 
won’t forget you; don’t forget me’.21  In other words, BN has operated per a classic style of political 
clientelism, filtering even programmatic policies through a discretionary screen. 
Malaysia’s opposition parties have historically been closed off from access to public resources.22 Nevertheless, 
their campaign promises have, in part, rivalled BN’s for targeted club goods. But crucially, these promises 
have been predicated on the parties’ being elected to office, preferably at the federal level, and have lacked 
BN’s credible threat of punishing defectors. As such, pledges have tended to be programmatic, however 
pitched towards demarcated groups. Meanwhile, opposition politicians in state and federal legislative office 
could build ties with potential supporters through ostensibly programmatic state-level welfare schemes via 
strategic brokerage and credit-claiming, or help individuals navigate the bureaucracy, or offer other forms of 
intermediation. Such personalized assistance may generate ‘feelings of obligation’ even without credible 
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threat of monitoring or penalizing failure to reciprocate.23  24 They emphasized constituency service more than 
payments, permitting retrospective yet personalistic voting.25  
The second issue is that of political and socio-economic context. Despite heavy use of clientelistic 
inducements, Malaysia provides relatively well-institutionalized and programmatically delivered health care, 
education, infrastructure, and other government programmes. Personalistic aspects thus coexist with relatively 
universal benefits – yet they still pre-empt more democratic practice. The personalized nature of Malaysian 
politics reflects and entrenches illiberal governing institutions and practices. Malaysian citizens have limited 
electoral choice, voting only for two levels of parliamentary government – state and national legislatures26 – at 
five-year intervals. Until 2018, federal power had never changed hands, limiting the extent to which elections 
served as a valid measure of either prospective or retrospective support. Moreover, federal legislators meet for 
no more than a few months – and only weeks for state lawmakers – each year, and spend little of their time on 
policy-making, nor do parliamentary structures or resources facilitate a policy-making focus. Even campaign 
periods are abbreviated, presenting little chance for voters to absorb extensive information about candidates’ 
or parties’ policy positions. These institutions both reflect and entrench a political culture that downplays 
programmatic outputs through politically neutral institutions. 
Instead, intensive personal relationships between citizens and politicians have acted as substitutes for 
responsiveness via elections and responsible party government. Citizens with limited chance to hold their 
government responsible for policies and promises could still demand that their individual legislators do their 
best for their districts. Ongoing interaction between constituents and politicians reinforces affective ties, but 
also makes it easier for the latter to meet citizens’ practical needs and build bonds of gratitude in the process, 
whether or not state aid is unavailable or simply cannot be channelled in such a way that the legislator can 
claim credit for it. 
Economically, despite Malaysia’s performing well based on national economic indicators, many citizens 
experience pervasive economic uncertainty. A majority – 56% – of Malaysian respondents to the 2014 Asian 
Barometer Survey said they were ‘very concerned’ about the loss of their or their family’s major source of 
income in the next year. Thirty-three per cent identified inflation as the most important problem facing the 
country.27  Similarly, polled several months before the 2018 election, 40% of respondents reported being 
unable to pay bills on time and 64% felt ‘stressed about the future’.28 Even token handouts may thus have 
tangible impact. Moreover, simply signalling credibly that a politician, if elected, will help a constituent 
access available benefits, regardless of the party responsible for the programmes in question, may reassure 
those voters who think in instrumental, prospective terms, while also allowing retrospective assessment of aid 
proffered to date. 
Base-building between Elections 
What most clearly reveals the salience of clientelist linkages in Malaysia is the extent to which Malaysia’s 
state legislators (known as Ahli Dewan Undangan Negeri, ADUN) and federal MPs constantly embed 
themselves in the lives of their constituents. To explore the extent and forms of such patterns, we draw from a 
telephone survey in June 2016 done by independent pollster Merdeka Centre, and where possible corroborate 
its findings with additional evidence gathered from interviews, news sources, and legislators’ reports of 
expenditures. These data suggest that the relationships at issue follow a classic clientelistic pattern in their 
mutuality, hierarchy, and iteration, plus an exchange aspect that comes out most clearly at elections, when 
citizens can reciprocate support with their votes. 
The survey shows that Malaysia’s elected representatives are remarkably present in the lives of their 
constituents. Almost half (46%) of respondents reported having met their MP or ADUN at least once in the 
past year. Twenty per cent reported that an elected representative had attended a wedding, funeral, religious 
ceremony, or open house (common in Malaysia for celebrating religious and other festivals) in their 
household. Although these representatives often came bearing gifts – 46% reported receiving a gift when the 
representative visited – our interviews with state and federal legislators from the gamut of political parties 
indicate that those gifts are generally funded out-of-pocket and essentially pro forma, ranging from RM10 to 
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around RM200, per the giver’s means and status. Sixteen per cent of the total sample reported having 
requested some form of assistance (for instance, with jobs, money, or letters of support for schools, 
scholarships, or agencies) from an elected representative or political party in the past year. 
To facilitate outreach, nearly all politicians, in office or aspiring to be, establish service centres as key sites for 
outreach and interaction. Two-thirds of our survey respondents knew where their ADUN’s or MP’s nearest 
service centre was. Legislators with constituency-development funds (termed ‘allocations’) generally finance 
both their service centre costs (site rental, staff salaries, etc.) and grants or materials provided from those 
public funds. BN federal and state governments have not given opposition legislators allocations, however, 
channelling them instead to unelected BN penyelaras (coordinators) in those constituencies. 
This practice adds a level of contingency to mundane outlays of public resources. Although opposition 
legislators may fundraise to afford some similar dispensations, only voters in BN parliamentary constituencies 
or under BN state representatives in BN-held states have typically been able to access public resources to 
support community festivities, local infrastructure projects, and so forth – for which the politician, of course, 
claims credit. That PH-held state governments have replicated this selective grant of allocations, albeit 
conceding non-PH state representatives token allotments, raised immediate questions about whether the new 
PH federal government would maintain or change this patronage-oriented approach. We return to this issue 
later. 
Concrete, accessible data on how elected officials spend their allocations are limited, but PH state 
representatives in PH-held states have moved towards more transparent documentation. One such source of 
data is People’s Justice Party (Parti Keadilan Rakyat, PKR) MP Wong Chen, who holds the Subang (formerly 
Kelana Jaya) seat in the state of Selangor. In 2017, Wong posted on his website the exact details of how he 
dispersed funds in 2015. Of his total budget of RM383,000, he gave 80% as direct payments to constituents, 
non-governmental organizations, schools, and community organizations. Almost half (49%) of that 
expenditure consisted of direct cash donations to constituents, in amounts ranging from RM150 to RM2500. 
His office details their extensive ‘welfare month’ distributions over social media. Many constituents received 
payments in successive years (23% in both 2014 and 2015). Our interviews with several dozen PH legislators 
confirm the general pattern this one MP’s record suggests, of giving generally small payments to many 
recipients, both individuals and groups. While some PH legislators have prioritized household or individual 
welfare payments to supplement or stand in for state support, others have emphasized signature infrastructure 
investments such as community parks or playgrounds, or have divvied up much of their available funds for 
small, generally equal grants to local religious and cultural organizations that expected donations and could 
count on receiving them from BN. 
The amounts that opposition legislators could use towards these essentially goodwill payments to reinforce 
clientelist ties with material patronage were, however, dwarfed by those of BN legislators. Under Najib, BN 
parliamentarians’ annual allocations increased from RM1 million to RM5 million by 2015, before edging up 
even further;29 moreover, BN legislators noted in our interviews with them that they could request additional 
funds as needed. Indeed, these interviews revealed at least two odd quirks to which the availability of such 
supplemental resources gave rise. First, few BN legislators were able to tell us how much their exact 
allocations were – they were not unwilling, but unsure; and second, BN state representatives in PH-held states 
confidently rejected partial allocations, when offered, knowing that their party would provide adequately. 
(Officially, they claimed to be insulted at being granted less than their PH counterparts, even though their 
coalition denied opposition legislators any allocation at all.30) Indeed, even PH state representatives in Penang 
and Selangor, granted full and increasing state allocations, could not rival the resources available to their BN 
colleagues. BN component parties’ substantial business ventures and access to rents left them far wealthier 
than those in PH and hence able to support their legislators, even apart from as-needed project funds from 
federal agencies. 
Whether because they have been led to expect such localized support, or whether their requests initiated this 
pattern, Malaysian voters prioritize community service among legislators’ roles. The share of our respondents 
who ranked ‘law-making’ highest among what they wanted their MPs to be doing was essentially nil (under 
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0.5%) and legislating did not feature at all among what our respondents thought should be ADUNs’ most 
important responsibility. Moreover, 31% of respondents felt that MPs should be responsible just to their own 
constituency, rather than to the nation as a whole. 
Yet, however locally-oriented, citizens’ priorities do not entirely centre around material demands. The same 
proportion that had requested direct assistance had had some proactive contact with elected officials over local 
issues. Sixteen per cent of our sample reported having contacted their representatives to solve neighbourhood 
problems – although a greater share, 22%, had contacted a government agency about such concerns. 
Moreover, even if they expected their elected officials to prioritize community service, not legislating, our 
respondents claimed that agreement with elected representatives’ policy preferences and platforms was 
important to them, more so than having representatives of their same ethnic or religious identity. 
Still, both our survey and interviews suggest ethnic and class distinctions. Notably, even though Chinese-
based parties had come to increase their focus on local-level engagement by the early 1990s, including both 
service-delivery and brokering access to government agencies,31  our findings show Malay respondents to be 
more likely to have made, and to privilege, these personal connections than were ethnic-Chinese respondents. 
Elected representatives, too, visit different events in line with ethnicity. For instance, Indian survey 
respondents reported that their representatives had attended funerals, while Chinese respondents reported 
representatives going to open houses. Malay legislators, or those with significantly Malay electorates, 
recounted attending endless constituents’ weddings, portraying those visits as especially characteristic of the 
community. Other community outreach centres around religious and cultural festivals such as the Hindu 
Ponggal festival, Chinese New Year, and meals at dawn and dusk throughout the Muslim fasting month of 
Ramadan. On the voters’ part, ethnic-Chinese respondents were the most likely never to have met with their 
MP; ethnic Indians reported the highest incidence of having contacted a legislator at least once, followed by 
Muslim Bumiputera in East Malaysia, then Malays. In line with literature suggesting the greater pull of 
patronage among poorer voters, 41% of respondents with household monthly incomes under RM2000 said 
they had met with their MP at least once, versus around 10% less in all other income brackets. 
Importantly, we note only minor differences between constituent experiences in parliamentary seats held by 
opposition or BN legislators – less of a divergence than one might expect, if the purpose of these interactions 
was purely to give and receive patronage, given the parties’ vastly unequal resources. Thirty-one per cent of 
respondents in PH constituencies had met their MP, compared with 38% of those under BN. But suggesting 
that patronage is still significant, 18% of respondents in BN constituencies had asked their representatives for 
some form of assistance, versus 12% under PH. As Table 1 indicates, the most common requests were 
essentially resource-neutral – and our interviews indicate that even opposition legislators do feel their letters 
of support and similar interventions carry weight with bureaucrats. For more concrete assistance such as 
money and jobs, BN representatives would have an advantage, offering a plausible explanation for the higher 
share of requests they field.32  
Those who did ask elected representatives or political parties for help were remarkably successful, as Table 2 
shows; opposition as well as BN legislators often met these demands. (Importantly for comparative reference, 
jobs are the least-commonly granted request – despite the fact that some scholars deﬁne patronage exclusively 
as distribution of public-sector jobs, contingent upon political support.33 The civil service is almost entirely 




Table 1. Types of assistance, by category (among those reporting requesting assistance). 
 
Table 2. Successfully received assistance, by category (among those requesting assistance). 
 
Table 3. Sources of assistance. 
 
Furthermore, in line with our ﬁndings regarding what eﬀorts citizens prioritize among elected representatives, 
and reﬂecting the unaccountable nature of unelected local governments, nearly twice as many supplicants 
appeal at the level of the ADUN or MP than to local-level oﬃcials at the municipal or village level, as Table 3 
details.35  
These survey data, which qualitative findings from our interviews and observations confirm, suggest that 
patronage and clientelistic ties, including personalized connections between legislators and constituents, are 
important to understand how citizens access (and politicians mediate access to) state institutions and 
resources. They feature prominently in Malaysian elections as a continuation of ties already forged in repeated 
interactions. As we consider next, part of the opposition’s increased appeal in 2018 was surely this tangible 
evidence that it could provide for citizens. Although no one strategy or form of politician–voter linkage 
dominates completely, that PH as well as BN legislators maintain clientelist linkages and deploy patronage-
9 
 
based tactics should temper our expectations for a definitive programmatic turn following the recent change in 
government. 
The 2018 Election 
On the surface, the 2018 election featured a familiar litany of promises of infrastructure development and 
targeted policies. While the grandest of these appeals were on BN’s side, given its control of federal coffers, 
PH also reassured voters that they would not lose out by switching sides. 
Central to BN’s campaign strategy was an expansionary federal budget. The final ‘election budget’ in October 
2017 promised additional financial assistance, both subsidies and local-development projects, to core Malay 
constituencies, including rural farmers and fishers, current and retired civil servants, and lower-income 
groups. It also lowered already minimal income taxes for the middle class and introduced or expanded 
allowances or other benefits for everyone from the disabled and their caretakers, to new parents, to indigenous 
orang asli villagers, to non-Malay entrepreneurs and employees of government-linked corporations (GLCs). 
Presenting the budget to parliament, Najib described it as ‘happy news that will put a smile on everyone’s 
faces’.36 Allocations for affordable housing, medical facilities, and more resurfaced during the campaign 
itself, as BN candidates promised specific constituencies projects should they win. The BN’s unconditional 
cash-transfer scheme 1Malaysia People's Aid (Bantuan Rakyat 1Malaysia, BRIM), along with supplemental 
benefits for specific blocs (newlyweds, undergraduates, etc.), also featured in campaign advertisements and 
appeals, and Najib promised additional post-election payments. 
Having governed Malaysia’s two wealthiest states, Selangor and Penang, for a decade, PH could now 
broadcast its success not only in advancing economic growth and better governance, but also in distributing 
benefits such as free water and shuttle-buses. Moreover, both states had their own, state-level unconditional 
cash-transfer programmes, offering subsidies for students, the bereaved, the poor, seniors, and other 
categories.37 PH’s Democratic Action Party (DAP) and PKR had also engaged in outreach programmes in 
Sabah and Sarawak starting long before elections, offering collaboratively built, small-scale infrastructure 
projects such as solar power, roads, and piped water. As interviewees from both parties explained, their 
approach aimed not just to build credibility as providers – these necessarily-limited initiatives planted the 
notion that if PH had access to federal resources, they would do much more – but also as being more 
approachable and concerned than the yet-to-deliver BN. 
Both sides thus ran on overall economic progress as well as selective benefits for key groups, including 
programmatic promises given a contingent particularistic spin, and both could count on a degree of favourable 
retrospective economic voting plus prospective evaluation of promises now on the table. (A related issue, 
beyond the scope of this article, is affirmative action: that PH had added a Malay-based communal party, the 
Malaysian United Indigenous Party [Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia, Bersatu], led by Mahathir, to reassure 
Malay voters that voting PH would not put an end to Bumiputera privileges.) The mix of appeals meant that 
otherwise change-seeking voters did not need to fear losing particularistic benefits for supporting PH, even if 
PH’s platform entailed a different mix of lures or temporary diminution of those benefits. 
Rather, the backlash against corruption, and against Najib in particular, cast these respective appeals in a 
different light. PH argued in campaign speeches that BN could afford its programmes only through an 
unpopular goods and services tax (GST) and spending cuts elsewhere, eroding citizens’ net gain. Even if PH 
promised less in their basket of ‘goodies’, then voters would still be better off: PH vowed to get rid of the 
GST and to restore subsidies and other supports for fuel, higher education, and other household expenses. 
Moreover, despite denigrating BR1M as ‘political bribery’38 even after its initial partisan bump had 
diminished,39 PH came around. Its 2018 Alternative Budget40 pledged to maintain BR1M, albeit adding mild 
conditionality. 
Of course, supplementing these instrumental appeals were carefully cultivated personal networks: the service- 
and outreach-fed clientelist linkages both sides prioritized. That so many on the PH side were personally well 
known, with reputations for helping constituents, including across ethnic lines, helped to undercut BN’s usual 
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efforts to frame the opposition as ideologically extreme, ethnically unrepresentative, and incredible.41 BN-
aligned media raised familiar tropes of the DAP as ‘Chinese chauvinist’, anti-Islam, insufficiently loyal to 
Malaysia’s hereditary sultans, and so on. However, not only could the DAP note that it was contesting fewer 
seats than partner-party Bersatu, unequivocally backed Mahathir for prime-ministership, and featured 
noteworthy candidates from across ethnic categories, but also, ethnic-Chinese DAP leaders had convincing 
records on which to run. Those score-sheets highlighted minutely documented community outreach and 
service, as well as programmatic welfare policies, distribution of which aimed to assign clear credit to the 
politicians and party and to cultivate gratitude. What the DAP and the other parties in PH had been heretofore 
unable to provide in material terms, voters might thus assume, would now be possible – and without the 
corrosive effects of BN-level corruption and over-concentration of public resources in a few hands. 
These relationships and reputations, however, clearly varied in timbre and salience among a wider set of 
issues that came to the fore in 2018. First, there was regional variation. Our interviews with legislators from 
PAS strongholds Kelantan (which it had ruled for the past 28 years) and Terengganu show the Islamist party 
had consistently reinforced its ideological appeals with personalized outreach. PH’s limited party machinery 
in these north-eastern states, coupled with popular approval of PAS’s record and messaging around clean 
Islamic-inspired governance, seemingly limited the power of PH’s ‘demonstration effect’ there. As for Sabah 
and Sarawak, while PH’s greater success cannot be directly attributed to its micro-infrastructure projects, 
which PH respondents expressed no expectation of having quick electoral effect given BN’s larger counter-
projects, these projects may still have reassured voters frustrated with unfulfilled BN promises. 
Second, even strong patronage networks among ruling-party elites frayed as the 1Malaysia Development 
Berhad case was linked directly to Najib, his family, and his political allies, tethering UMNO to a highly 
public, massive corruption scandal. UMNO candidates and strategists, our interviews suggest, were aware of 
Najib’s drag on the party’s popularity and their need to respond better to PH jibes. Some struggled to frame 
local outreach and assistance as distinct from central-party initiatives, albeit unable openly to denounce their 
party leader, their own patron. Meanwhile, as a new opposition leader who embodied UMNO’s own economic 
glory-days, Mahathir further curtailed BN room for manoeuvre, and may help account for PH’s gains among 
state-dependent but economically distressed constituents, such as Federal Land Development Agency 
(FELDA) settlers and civil servants. 
Will These Patterns Persist? 
As shown, unlike one-time or episodic vote-buying in many other contexts, the material lures that marked 
GE14 punctuated enduring relationships between politicians and their constituents. Although BN rallied 
material power and the implicit or explicit threat of punishment to maintain its majorities, PH had both a track 
record this time to support credible counter-proposals and a compelling frame to discount BN offers. Now that 
the former opposition parties control the institutional apparatus, PH can either fortify painstakingly built 
relationships or rewrite them. While we are still in the early stages, the evidence leans towards continuity, at 
least in the short-to-medium term. 
While material links to the electorate are democratically less than ideal, they are also extremely common in 
even developed democratic contexts. The issue for the PH government is whether or not it will lessen 
dependence on material links as substitutes for more genuinely democratic representation without implicitly 
threatening the withdrawal of such benefits. But this government has inherited the skewed institutions BN 
created over decades in power. The list of political reforms both the coalition itself and allies in civil society 
have proposed is daunting, ranging from restoring civil liberties to restructuring GLCs, reworking campaign 
finance laws, and reinstating local elections. 
What then may help to spur a shift towards more programmatic linkages and encourage voters to weigh 
legislating and oversight? Having to prove itself before the next election, the PH government could seek 
institutional reforms in how legislators work, to draw less of their time and energy away from policy-making. 
Yet, among the new government’s earliest decisions was that opposition MPs would receive only one-fifth of 
the annual allocation of PH parliamentarians43 – an improvement over BN’s zero, but still an indication that 
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the new government expects its MPs to use public resources to curry targeted support.44 As BN did in the past, 
even if less starkly, PH is punishing constituencies who did not vote for them. 
Among the factors that could help the PH government institute reforms is its key antagonists’ disarray. The 
election spurred defections, reducing BN to its original three component parties, and UMNO’s new leaders 
will face internal opposition. With now-limited access to federal resources and with control of only two state 
governments, BN will need to rethink how it connects with the electorate. (Already, the component Malaysian 
Chinese Association [MCA] has announced that it is shutting its service centres, for lack of funds and 
purpose.45) The time it takes BN to regroup and reorganize may allow PH a window of opportunity to institute 
reforms towards a more programmatic order, in line with much of the rest of its manifesto – since economic 
promises, while important, were hardly the whole picture, and offer less opportunity to distance its 
government from BN’s model. 
Moreover, evidence from elsewhere suggests clientelist voting may gradually diminish after democratization, 
given experience of competitive elections and longer track-records on which to evaluate candidates. 
Competition may drive parties to focus more on public goods than siphoning rents for private goods. Also, 
especially with politicians’ encouragement, voters may come both to prioritize collective goods and MPs’ 
legislative and oversight activities, and to have the information and retrospective experience to evaluate 
politicians on those terms.46 Also potentially relevant to Malaysia are Ward Berenschot’s findings for 
Indonesia, that lack of economic diversification and high dependence on the state, rather than more commonly 
cited factors of relative prosperity, urbanization, and middle-class strength, matter for the prevalence of 
clientelism.47 Should PH succeed in revamping the sizeable government-linked share of the economy, we 
might then see lesser reliance on state support broadly, as well as less ample pools of patronage resources for 
any government to tap. Yet this refocusing may depend on whether PH leaders are willing to enact changes 
that could potentially undermine the electorally useful relationships they have built with voters. 
These possibilities are speculative, at this point. PH has the opportunity to retool its linkages with constituents 
at ground level, the prevailing balance of particularistic and programmatic policies, and the state’s role in the 
economy. We do not yet see convincing evidence that voters have rejected personalized politics and targeted 
benefits, even if they also value a cleaned-up administration and non-economic goals. Only time will tell what 
PH will make of its moment. 
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